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Abstract:  
 
In a recent QJE-article, Gneezy and Potters (1997) present experimental evidence for the 
impact of feedback frequency on individual risk taking behavior in repeated investment 
decisions. They find an increased willingness to invest into a risky asset if less frequent 
feedback about the outcome of previous investments is provided. The observed decision 
pattern is explained by myopic loss aversion, a combination of mental accounting and 
loss aversion. In this note, we argue that the findings of Gneezy and Potters on the 
relationship between feedback frequency and risk taking are not as general as they might 
seem. We provide theoretical arguments and experimental evidence to demonstrate that 
the reported phenomenon is not robust to changes in the risk profiles of the given 
investment options. 
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I. Introduction 
In a recent QJE-article, Gneezy and Potters (1997) report experimental evidence for the 
impact of feedback frequency on individual risk taking behavior in repeated investment 
decisions. They found an increased willingness of subjects to invest their endowment into a 
risky asset if less frequent feedback about the outcome of previous investments was 
provided. It is noteworthy that the experimental subjects were provided with ex ante 
information about the exact outcome distribution of the relevant lotteries. Hence, the 
observed difference in proportions of risky investments for different feedback conditions 
cannot be attributed to informational causes.  
Gneezy and Potters (1997) propose a behavioral explanation for the phenomenon. It is well 
known from the literature that individuals tend to neglect the overall decision context when 
making sequential decisions.1 A decision to accept three identical and independent draws of a 
gamble (as the uncertain outcomes of the investment) might be based on an isolated 
evaluation of each single gamble rather than the relevant overall distribution. Gneezy and 
Potters (1997) argue that feedback frequency has an impact on the framing of a sequential 
decision problem. Less frequent feedback helps subjects to overcome their myopia since they 
observe a more aggregated outcome distribution. Thus, subjects base their decisions on 
longer evaluation periods. 
The general question, whether a longer evaluation period and thus a less myopic evaluation 
of a lottery sequence makes it appear more attractive, was addressed by Benartzi and Thaler 
(1995). They argued that in a myopic evaluation of a lottery sequence, the effect of time 
diversification, i.e. the compensation of losses in some draws by gains in other draws, is not 
appreciated. Because of loss aversion (the well established behavioral insight that losses are 
more heavily weighted than gains of same size)2 a sequence will thus look less attractive in a 
myopic evaluation of its components.  
                                                 
1 Cf. Benartzi and Thaler (1999). The general phenomenon was dubbed "Narrow Framing" by Kahneman and 
Lovallo (1993).  
2 Loss aversion was first introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) as part of their prospect theory. It is 
reviewed in Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1991). 
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In this paper, we build on the analysis of Langer and Weber (forthcoming) on the differences 
between aggregated and segregated (isolated) evaluations of lottery portfolios and argue that 
the relation between feedback frequency and risk taking behavior is not as clear and general 
as the existing literature might suggest. In particular, we demonstrate that the experimental 
evidence of Gneezy and Potters (1997) is driven by the specific risk profile of the lottery 
used in their study.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we provide a short 
description of the experimental design and the results of Gneezy and Potters (1997). In 
section III we introduce the proposed explanation (myopic loss aversion) and provide some 
theoretical insights on the predicted robustness of the phenomenon. In section IV we present 
the design and the results of an own experimental study in which we demonstrate the 
feedback frequency effect of Gneezy and Potters to be driven by the specific risk profiles of 
their lotteries. Section V concludes with a short discussion.  
II. Experimental Design and Results of Gneezy and Potters (1997) 
In a simple paper and pencil experiment, Gneezy and Potters (1997) demonstrated the impact 
of feedback frequency on individual risk taking behavior. In each of nine rounds, subjects 
were endowed with the same initial amount of money (about US$ 1) and had to decide which 
proportion of this endowment to invest into a risky lottery and which to keep at hand.3 With a 
1/3 chance the invested money increased by 250% (i.e. US$ 1 became US$ 3.5), with a 2/3 
chance the investment was lost. Subjects knew ex ante about this outcome distribution. The 
return from the investment as well as the money kept at hand was transferred after each 
round to the subject's account for real payment. Subjects could not bet the money earned in 
previous rounds. One group of subjects (high frequency group) had to make investment 
decisions (choose the amount to invest) every round. After each round they got feedback 
about the outcome of the lottery. The other group (low frequency group) made binding 
investment decisions for three rounds (identical investments). They only got feedback about 
the combined outcome of the three draws before they made the next investment decision.  
                                                 
3 The study of Gneezy and Potters (1997) actually consisted of two parts. We only refer to the first part of their 
experiment. 
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Gneezy and Potters reported an increased willingness of their subjects to invest into the risky 
option if outcome feedback was provided less frequent. In the low frequency group (n=42), 
subjects invested on average 67,4 % of their endowment into the risky gamble. This 
percentage is significantly higher than the average 50,5 % of the high frequency group 
(n=41).  
III. Theoretical Analysis of the Myopic Loss Aversion Explanation 
Gneezy and Potters (1997) designed their experiment to obtain the above-mentioned effect of 
feedback frequency on risk taking behavior. In fact, their experiment was set up to be an 
explicit test of the myopic loss aversion idea, which was first introduced by Benartzi and 
Thaler (1995) to provide a behavioral explanation for the Equity Premium Puzzle.4 Myopic 
loss aversion combines two concepts, mental accounting and loss aversion. The first is an 
assumption about the way individuals frame and thus process a sequential decision problem, 
the second is an assumption about properties of the value function used for the evaluation of 
the lotteries involved.  
To illustrate the interplay of these two assumptions, we take up the simple example used by 
Benartzi and Thaler (1995) as well as by Gneezy and Potters (1997). Assume a loss averse 
decision maker with a value function of the form has to decide 
whether to accept a gamble    . 
She would reject the offer since the 2.5 times stronger impact of the loss outweights the 
higher gain. However, if the decision maker is confronted with two independent draws of the 
same lottery, her acceptance decision depends on her framing of the problem. If she neglects 
the overall decision context and evaluates each lottery in isolation, she would still reject to 
gamble. In contrast, if she considers the aggregated distribution of the two 
lotteries, she will accept the risk, as she derives a positive evaluation (+25). 
                                                 
4 Thaler et al. (1997) provide a similar test. Benartzi and Thaler (1995) show in their original work that the 
surprisingly high historical equity premium can be explained by the assumption that a typical (loss averse) 
investor evaluates the investment alternatives for one year time periods despite his much longer investment 
horizon. 
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The decision reversal in this example is driven by the fact that the loss, which is hidden in the 
mixed outcome of the overall distribution, is actually not treated as a loss in the evaluation 
process. There is a strong intuition that this kind of effect is not limited to specific types of 
lotteries. Because of loss aversion, sequences of mixed lotteries (i.e. with both potential 
losses and potential gains) should generally appear less attractive in a myopic evaluation.  
Gneezy and Potters (1997) rely on this intuition when they predict their subjects’ higher 
willingness to invest into the risky option in the low feedback frequency condition. They 
argue that less frequent feedback leads to a less myopic evaluation of the lottery sequence 
causing the investment options to look more attractive. Combining the intuitive robustness of 
the myopic loss aversion idea with the obvious ability of the feedback frequency to induce 
different evaluation periods, there seems no reason why the experimental results of Gneezy 
and Potters (1997) on the relation between feedback frequency and risk taking should not be 
general.  
However, the piecewise linear function in the above example is a very specific type of value 
function. Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), the 
most prominent descriptive decision theory, assumes not only loss aversion, but also 
diminishing sensitivity in the gain as well as in the loss domain. By this diminishing 
sensitivity the value function turns out to be concave for gains and convex for losses. Taking 
into account this curvature, Langer and Weber (forthcoming) recently pointed out that the 
attractiveness of a lottery portfolio does not necessarily increase if the aggregated distribution 
is evaluated instead of the isolated lotteries. For specific risk profiles they even proposed a 
reverse effect.  
Comparison of relative attractiveness 
These findings can be applied to the scenario of Gneezy and Potters (1997). If we take up 
their assumption that the low feedback frequency condition leads to an evaluation of the 
aggregated distribution of three independent gambles while the high feedback frequency 
causes subjects to make isolated evaluations of each gamble, we can formalize the relevant 
question: 
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• If A denotes the “aggregated evaluation” (i.e. the evaluation of the overall distribution 
of three independent gambles) and S denotes the “segregated evaluation” (i.e. three 
times the evaluation of each gamble), what is the sign of the difference D:= A-S ?5 
For the analysis of the evaluation difference D, we assume a general value function: 
 
as proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992).6 This value function reflects loss aversion via 
the parameter k as well as diminishing sensitivity via the parameter α.  
The lottery L, used in the experiment of Gneezy and Potters (1997), offered a 2/3 chance of 
losing the invested money and a 1/3 chance of gaining 2.5 times the investment. Coded in 
terms of gains and losses, the subjects thus faced lotteries of the form:   
To demonstrate the relevance of the risk profile, we embed this gamble L into a broader set 
of lotteries. This set is sufficiently rich, even if we restrict our attention to „all or nothing“ 
gambles, i.e. gambles with some probability to lose all the invested money and some chance 
to get a positive return on the investment. We define a general lottery (p,g) to be of the form: 
with ]1,0[p ∈  and %)%,0( ∞∈g . For each of these lotteries (p,g), we 
compute the evaluation difference D. Lotteries with positive D-values look more attractive in 
aggregated evaluation, lotteries with negative D-values are more attractive in segregated 
(myopic) evaluation.7 
As each lottery (p,g) is defined by two parameters only we can display a bounded part of the 
lottery space as a two-dimensional grid and present the computed D-values via iso-D-lines. 
In figure 1 such a diagram is displayed for a value function αkv  with k=2.25 and α=0.88. 
These parameters were determined by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) to be the median 
values of the estimates for their experimental subjects. Lotteries in the upper right corner are 
                                                 
5 We can omit an index for the number of replications n as we exclusively focus on the case n=3 in this paper.  
6 In fact, they did not require the exponent for gains and losses to be the same. However, they found identical 
exponents in an estimation based on an experimental study.  
7 We are only interested in the sign of the evaluation difference. This sign does not depend on the absolute size 
of the lottery outcomes. We base, however, all our computations and graphical illustrations on a normalized 
investment of 1$.  
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very attractive, lotteries in the lower left corner are extremely unattractive. We printed the 
lottery L = (1/3, 250%) of Gneezy and Potters (1997) into the diagram. It is slightly above 
the bold line, which represents all lotteries with an expected value of zero.
The most important iso-D line for D=0 is easy to recognize as the boundary between the dark 
(D<0) and the light (D>0) area of the diagram. It can be seen that, though for most lotteries 
positive D-values are computed, the sign of D turns negative if high gain probabilities are 
involved. It is interesting to note that there even exist negative D-values for lotteries with 
moderate expected values (in the lower right corner). Hence negative D-values are not 
restricted to very attractive lotteries, but exist for lotteries with the same expected value as 
the lottery L of Gneezy and Potters (1997).  
Figure 1: Iso-D lines for k=2.25 and a = 0.8. 
 
In figure 1 two further lotteries are marked which will later reappear in our experimental 
study. The lottery K= has about the same expected value (+17%) as
lottery L, but a significantly lower D-value. The lottery J=                        has a lower, but still 
positive expected value (+3.5%). For the parameters k=2.25 and α=0.88, used in figure 1, the 
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D-values for both lotteries are still slightly positive. However, the exact size of the dark 
bulge in the lower right corner strongly depends on the parameters k and α. 
Figure 1 nicely demonstrates the relevance of the risk profile for the increase or decrease of 
attractiveness through a myopic evaluation. However, the figure is not suited for a direct 
explanation of the results of Gneezy and Potters (1997) and according predictions for other 
risk profiles.8 For this purpose, it is more appropriate to examine for which subjects (i.e. for 
which value functions) different investment decisions in the two evaluation modes are 
predicted.  
Dependence of the investment decisions on the value function 
First it should be mentioned that this kind of formal analysis cannot explain why the subjects 
in the design of Gneezy and Potters (1997) chose intermediate levels of investment.9 If 
individuals frame the decision situation in the proposed way, they should either invest all the 
available endowment or nothing. This holds, because for a value function αkv  the aggregated 
evaluation A as well as the segregated evaluation S are scaled by a factor αc if the investment 
level is scaled by a factor c. Hence, if an individual is willing to invest in one of the 
conditions (i.e. positivity of A or S respectively) the highest possible investment provides the 
highest evaluation. A perfect fit of the theoretical argument with the experimental results 
would thus require only extreme choices with the different mean investment proportions (for 
the different feedback conditions) resulting from different proportion of 100%-investors.10 
Following this idea, we examine how the variability in value function parameters should 
influence the proportion of investors from a theoretical point of view. If we assume that 
subjects vary in their degree of loss aversion and the strength of diminishing sensitivity, it is 
interesting to analyze, which combinations of k and ? in fact drive the difference in 
investment proportions. In figure 2, we display for each (k, ?) combination with k in [1, 6] 
and ? in [0.25, 1] the acceptance of a 3-lottery portfolio in both evaluation modes. These 
                                                 
8 It just provides a hint which risk profiles promise to be particularly interesting. 
9 We do not have the individual data of the Gneezy and Potters study, but in our replication of their experiment, 
we found a lot of intermediate investment levels. 
10 Intermediate investment levels could be explained by a naïve diversification heuristic (Benartzi and Thaler, 
forthcoming). Cf. Siebenmorgen and Weber (2000) for an explicit incorporation of naïve diversification into an 
evaluation model. 
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computations are based on the lottery L used by Gneezy and Potters. Note, that each point in 
the plane now corresponds to a specific individual (that is: a specific value function) not to a 
lottery as in figure 1. A risk neutral subject is placed in the lower left corner; the above-
mentioned typical (k, ?) combination (2.25, 0.88) is further marked in the plane 
Figure 2: Investment decisions for different evaluation modes for the lottery L. 
Under this analysis, all individuals with high degrees of loss aversion are unwilling to invest 
into the lottery sequence in both evaluation modes. Only subjects with a very low degree of 
loss aversion and moderate diminishing sensitivity are willing to invest into the sequence of 
L-lotteries independent of the evaluation mode. Most interesting, however, is the dark area 
named A
?
 in the upper left corner. These subjects would only invest if they evaluate the 
aggregated distribution of the portfolio. There are no (k, ?)-combinations for which the 
individuals would invest in segregated, but not in aggregated evaluation.11 We do not need to 
know the exact distribution of real subjects in the (k, ?) plane to predict the experimental 
findings of Gneezy and Potters (1997) from this figure. The proportion of subjects placed in 
                                                 
11 This fact is not driven by the restriction of the maximum degree of loss aversion and strength of diminishing 
sensitivity. It would require a descriptively unrealistic ?>1 (i.e. risk proneness for gains and risk aversion for 
losses) to find this choice pattern. 
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the dark area causes the investment proportion to be higher for the low feedback frequency 
group. 
Now we will look at the same kind of picture for the lottery K, which has about the same 
expected value as L, but a higher gain probability (see figure 3). As the most interesting fact 
for lottery K there also exists a portion S
?
of (k, ?) combinations for which an investment is 
predicted for segregated, but not for aggregated evaluation. Hence the sign of the difference 
in investment proportions does now depend on assumptions about the distribution of subjects 
in the (k, ?) plane. While for the lottery K the (k, ?) combinations in the region S?  seem to be 
less typical of individual decision makers than the (k, ?) combinations in the region A?  (and 
we would thus not predict a higher investment proportion in the high frequency group from 
this analysis), the situations gets even more interesting if we decrease the expected value of 
the lotteries involved. 
In figure 4 we display the investment decisions for a lottery J with a 90% chance of a 15% 
gain. Note that this type of lottery should be considered quite typical for real world financial 
investments. The expected return on investment is 3,5%. The risk profile with its comparably 
high interest rate of 15%, but a considerable default probability could be interpreted as a junk 
bond (low rated) investment. For the J-lottery it turns out that the area Â almost disappeared 
and the size of the S
?
 area increased. For reasonable distributions of individuals in the (k, ?) 
plane a higher investment proportion can thus be predicted for the high frequency feedback 
group. 
We conclude this section with a short comment on the relevance of probability weighting. 
Prospect theory does not only assume value transformation, but also a probability distortion 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Such a weighting of 
probabilities is supposed to be particularly relevant for the lotteries J and K as extreme 
probabilities are involved. However, it turns out that the figures 3 and 4 do not qualitatively 
change if we incorporate probability weighting into our computations.12 Thus, the ignorance 
of probability weighting is not critical for our above hypotheses.   
                                                 
12 The area S
?
 moves a little further to the left in the figures 3 and 4 if probability weighting is incorporated.  
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Figure 3:  Investment decisions for different evaluation modes for the lottery K. 
Figure 4: Investment decisions for different evaluation modes for the lottery J. 
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IV. Replication of Gneezy and Potters (1997) with Different Risk Profiles  
To test the predictions of the theoretical analysis, we replicated the basic study of Gneezy 
and Potters (1997) with three different risk profiles. In contrast to the paper and pencil 
procedure of Gneezy and Potters, we conducted a computerized experiment and had a total of 
18 rounds instead of the 9 rounds of the comparable first part in the Gneezy and Potters 
study. Overall, 105 advanced business students from the University of Mannheim took part 
in the experiment. Thirty-six of them were used to replicate the results of Gneezy and Potters 
and received a lottery L. The other subjects were faced with either the lottery K or J from 
section III. From our theoretical analysis we hypothesized that the lottery J should be more 
appropriate (than K) to disprove the robustness of the results of Gneezy and Potters (1997). 
Nevertheless, we included the lottery K into the experimental analysis as we were interested 
in the impact of risk profile manipulation for an unchanged expected value, too. We refrained 
from choosing a lottery with an even higher gain probability than K (which by figure 1 
should be more appropriate to find the reverse effect of feedback frequency on risk taking), 
since for a higher gain probability most subjects would not have experienced any losses in 
their complete session.13 
As in the Gneezy and Potters design, we had a low and a high frequency condition. Subjects 
in the high frequency group had to decide in each of the 18 rounds which part of their 
endowment of 100 Pfennig14 they were willing to invest into the risky lottery. After each 
round they got outcome feedback and the remaining endowment plus the return from the 
lottery draw was booked into a personal account, which was used for real payment at the end 
of the experiment.15 In the low frequency group subjects had to make binding decisions for 
three rounds. They only got feedback about the combined outcome of the three draws. 
From the theoretical insights of section III we hypothesized that there would be a strong 
positive impact of a lower feedback frequency on the willingness to accept risks (i.e. a 
significantly higher investment proportion in the low frequency group) for the lottery L only. 
                                                 
13For the lotteries K and J we had 14 out of 69 subjects that experienced no losses in all 18 draws. 
14 At the time of the experiment 100 Pfennig were worth about 50 US cents.  
15 1000 Pfennig were subtracted from the collected money to determine the real pay off. Subjects knew ex ante 
about this payment pattern; in particular, they were informed about the total number of rounds. 
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We predicted the effect to be much less pronounced for the lottery K, and even reversed for 
the lottery J. 
Table 1 summarizes the results of the study. For the lottery L, the replication of the Gneezy 
and Potters design, the high frequency group (n=16) invested an average of 44,6% of their 
endowment in the risky asset. Meanwhile, the low frequency group (n=20) had an average 
investment proportion of 59,9%. Though the proportions itself are a little lower, the 
difference is remarkably similar to the original results of Gneezy and Potters (50,5% vs. 
67,4%). A non-parametric Mann-Whitney test determines the difference to be statistically 
significant (p<0.05).16  
 Lottery L 
2/3
1/3 +250%
- 100%  
Lottery K 
10%
90% + 30%
- 100%  
Lottery J 
10% 
90% + 15% 
- 100%  
Condition High 
Freq. 
Low 
Freq. 
High 
Freq. 
Low 
Freq. 
High 
Freq. 
Low 
Freq. 
Number of subjects N= 16 N=20 N=16 N=18 N=18 N=17 
Mean proportion of 
invested endowment 
44.6% 59.9% 82.4 % 75.5% 76.1% 67.9% 
Average investment 
of median subject 
36.0% 61.7% 85.3% 76.3% 85.3% 66.7% 
(**) 
 
(*) 
 
 
Table 1: Investment proportions for lotteries L, K and J ( **  and * denote significance on a 5% and 10% level)  
For the lotteries K and J opposite results were found. In line with our hypothesis for the 
lottery J, the 76,1% average investment proportion of the high frequency group (n=18) is 
higher (n.s.) than the average investment proportion 67,9% of the low frequency group 
(n=17). Somewhat surprisingly, we also observe a reversal for the lottery K. The high 
frequency group (n=16) invested an average of 82,4% of their endowment in the risky option, 
whereas the low frequency group (n=18) invested an average of 75,5%. A Mann-Whitney 
test determines this difference in investment proportions to be marginally statistically 
significant (p<0.1). In table 1 we also present median values, i.e. the average investment 
proportion of the median subject in each group. These values further demonstrate that the 
                                                 
16 Following Gneezy and Potters' (1997) null hypothesis (no difference) and alternative hypothesis (higher 
proportion for low frequency) we report one-tailed significance levels.  
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relation between feedback frequency and risk taking behavior, reported by Gneezy and 
Potters (1997), strongly depends on the risk profiles of the lotteries. 
V. Conclusion 
In this note, we argue that the previously reported increase in willingness to take risks, when 
feedback frequency is diminished, is not as general as the existing literature might suggest. 
An analysis based on Prospect Theory (Kahenman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1992) and Narrow Framing (Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993; Benartzi and Thaler, 
1995) shows that myopia does not generally decrease the attractiveness of a lottery sequence. 
A reverse effect is predicted for lotteries with specific risk profiles, as e.g. the risk profile of 
a junk bond. Since a higher feedback frequency supports myopia, we should expect an even 
higher willingness to invest into these lotteries if more frequent feedback is provided. We 
support these predictions by experimental evidence. For lotteries with a high gain probability, 
but a rather small gain size our experimental subjects invest a higher proportion of their 
endowment into this risky option if they receive more frequent feedback. Our research 
confirms the results of Gneezy and Potters (1997) that the feedback frequency influences the 
evaluation period and thereby the risk taking behavior. At the same time it demonstrates, 
however, that a more thorough analysis of the relation between evaluation period length and 
risk taking behavior is required to avoid the erroneous impression that the individual 
willingness to accept risks generally increases with a decreasing feedback frequency. The 
result of Gneezy and Potters (1997) regarding the impact of feedback frequency on the 
willingness to take risks is not robust to changes in the risk profiles of the investment 
options. 
 14 
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